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Abstract  
Institutional economics provide a useful frame to navigate the fuzzy world of governance structures. 
Of course markets, firms and relational contracting (or Hybrid Forms) are alternative tools which can 
complement or substitute each other to frame transactions made among economic agents. However, 
firms are not a single piece of governance structure as they might handle different transactions very 
differently. Either inside the firm, such as the day-to-day operational workflow, the hazards of R&D 
discovery and trials, the long term production of skills and knowledge through organized definition 
and allocation of tasks, the coordination between today’s and tomorrow’s operations e.g. between the 
various levels of management and the interactions with the stockholders, or outside the firm in the 
interactions with suppliers, customers bankers and the social or professional communities. Truly, those 
firms are all conglomerates of several governance sub-structures. So are the markets conglomerates of 
several governance mechanisms. It is why we are able to think about designing/redesigning the 
markets we have and to move to get the markets that we would like to have. Knowing all that: how to 
apply it to the existing Network Industries? 
Keywords  
Institutional economics; governance structures; markets; firms; network industries 
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1. Introduction 
“Institutions matter” (North 1990): “Markets and Hierarchies” (Williamson 1975), “The Firm, the 
Market and the Law” (Coase 1988). Within a few words as simple as these, a Copernican revolution 
occurred in economics. It is known today as “New Institutional Economics” (Brousseau & Glachant 
2008; Joskow 2008) - a term at least 40 years old- or as “economics of governance” (Williamson 
1996) - dealing with both organizations and, more broadly, institutions. 
I spent 20 years of my life seeking to understand it to the best of my ability through “learning by 
doing”. Governance, organization and institutions are territories too vast to be apprehended only in an 
abstract and general manner. To study real cases, to address reduced enigma, and to operationalise the 
concepts and the methodology for a single and tractable piece of research permit us to go ahead into 
the unchartered and unknown even if only slowly and step by step. Today in this paper I would like to 
share what I understand about “Governance in Network Industries” by studying it through “New 
Institutional” lenses (Brousseau & Glachant 2011 & 2012). 
The fact that some industries have some “networks” as structural backbones obviously contradicts 
the old classical axiom of the “invisible hand” acting from below/behind the market (Finger & 
Künneke 2011). Something similar is expressed when saying that some industries, their companies 
and related stakeholders are submitted to strong “network effects”. We expect to see there particular 
ways of addressing the governance puzzle because we may easily predict that transactions with very 
particular characteristics will require very particular governance regimes (Ménard & Shirley 2005). 
However, starting from such a very light and general statement would not bring us too far (Glachant & 
Perez 2008). What we still need to do before starting any further research in this area is to determine 
what the key particularities to track there actually are and why (Aoki 2001; Glachant, Hallack & 
Vazquez 2014; Glachant, Kahlfallah, Perez, Rious & Saguan 2013).  
We need, however, to define a theoretical frame ex ante from which to ask research questions 
articulated in a logical order. This is what I will do in part 2: “NIE is anything but new: what is it 
about?”. I am still not sure that NIE founding fathers (as Coase, North and Williamson) and mother 
(being Ostrom 1990 & 2005) really say the same about the deepest core of institutional questioning. 
This being clarified, we will end up with a set of key research questions to be asked to network 
industries within an institutional frame. However, this does not guarantee that what we call “network 
industries” in our day-to-day life is also a relevant or even a significant enough phenomenon in an 
institutional theoretical frame. This is what I will explore further in part 3: “Do Network Industries 
exist for NIE?” Having worked for twenty years in this area, I am presumably self-intoxicated enough 
to believe so (Joskow & Schmalensee 1983; Levy & Spiller 1994; Glachant 2002). But even so why 
you too should care? Would you miss that much by ignoring that NIE might provide a working 
research frame for governance in network industries? It is the last but not least question addressed in 
this paper in part 4: “If yes, then so what?” 
2. NIE is anything but new: what is it about? 
Reordering institutional economics in a very reduced set of logical questioning is an attractive, but 
daunting task that (to my knowledge) nobody has succeeded to perform (see Brousseau & Glachant 
2002 & 2008). I will then bypass that intractable difficulty by pretending to believe that a good enough 
proxy is to reduce NIE to four founding fathers (Coase, North and Williamson) and mother (Ostrom). 
Plus -to make everything really easier- I will also reduce each of these four to a caricature of my own. 
I do apologize in advance for any oversimplification by reminding you all that simplifying and “black-
boxing” are two basic auxiliaries of any reasoning.  
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2.1 Ronald Coase 
Let start with Ronald Coase. I will reduce his theory to three of his own words “The Firm, the Market 
and the Law”. In my mind, a very first typical Coasian statement is that the firm has long been 
forgotten as a basic institution of capitalism (see Coase 1937). As Coase restated in his final book 
(How China became capitalist, 2012), the firm is a kind of organization which is significantly 
different from the market, as correctly stated by Alfred Marshall at the end of the 19
th
 century. The 
firm, therefore, is not a production function. It is a kind of visible hand which departs from the 
invisible hand of the market. Unfortunately, Coase was still claiming in 2012 (at the age of 102!) that 
the firm is under-studied and largely unknown (I am not sure that this was a welcome comment for 
Oliver Williamson…).  
Then also comes the Law. Law too has been too long forgotten while Coase –on the contrary- was 
working with growing success at the Law Department in Chicago. Law is another basic institution of 
capitalism (see again «How China became capitalist» where Law plays a key role) because it gives a 
set of common and central rules to economic agents that are alternative to the purely decentralized and 
heterogeneous arrangements negotiated through the so-called «Coasian bargaining» (Remember the 
wrong Coasian economics of Stigler (see 1987); or see Cooter 2007 at Berkeley Law Faculty, a 
founding father of early and “right” Coasian Law & Economics) .  
Parallel to these two first big errors of economic reasoning, for decades (if not a century) the 
market itself has been long forgotten or misunderstood… by many economists. Market itself is an 
institution of capitalism. And, as such, it might be adapted, changed, rearranged, repaired, etc. to deal 
with many of its so-called “market deficiencies”. At least some of the deficiencies that Pigou (see 
1920) termed at the beginning of the 20th Century as «externalities» (literally: as effects being 
external to the market by nature; also see P. Samuelson (1958) at MIT in the second half of the 20th). 
For Coase the market can do much more than Pigou or Samuelson believed. Notably, the market can 
fix many “externality” difficulties if properly designed. Hence, today’s flourishing «market design» 
agenda: with well-designed property rights the radio, the TV (and later on the Internet) can easily bear 
vibrant markets and flourishing innovation waves. The same goes with airport -or rail- slots. 
Furthermore, with well-designed property rights a market for pollution allowances can efficiently and 
effectively cap pollution externality (SO2, NOx, CO2) to environmentally acceptable levels. The 
market is truly a robust and multiform «institutional structure of production» (see Coase’s Nobel 
speech in 1991) that the Law (or the soft Law called «regulation») can seriously upgrade to enhance 
the social welfare in many “market deficient” industries (See Brousseau & Glachant 2014; Ellerman 
2014; Anderson & Libecap 2014). 
2.2 Douglass North 
With Doug North (see 1990 & 2005) we are not going to walk on a sidewalk: we have to explore the 
entire world from his institutional space shuttle. First of all, many institutions and certainly all the key 
institutions (including the software/s engraved into our brains) are long living. We inherit them from 
the past as they are. There is no tabula rasa anywhere (except in the mind of Rene Descartes or the 
speeches of Mao Zedong). Second, we might aim at changing this or that institution, even all of them 
if you please. But the rules of the game and the set of incentives for playing the game of changing 
existing institutions are also coming from the existing institutional endowment. As evolutionary or 
revolutionary institutional players, we only play a la Tocqueville. You may also think: within «strong 
path dependency». Thirdly, it is very demanding to really understand what today’s existing 
institutional endowment permits or not, what a likely «today’s natural institutional outcome» is or 
what the «actual paths of feasible institutional changes or fixes» are. As there is no institutional short 
cut and no way out, researchers have to be really realistic with existing institutional settings. 
Economists in particular frequently know really too little about institutions and institutional change to 
be able to have credible reasoning before having checked the actual characteristics of the today’s 
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institutional endowment. As History matters a lot with institutions, the positive approach to 
institutions should dominate vis-a-vis the normative approach which is too frequently the only 
methodology economists dare to dignify. Fourth, the key existing institutions are not only economical 
(again not flowers sent to Williamson) as they are as well legal, political, social (including our beliefs) 
or cognitive (we humans –practitioners as well as intellectuals- are shaped or bounded by our 
knowledge and brain processing capabilities). From this we can derive a fundamental institutional 
research principle: the existing key institutions -as they are- are the first order of magnitude in 
understanding the world as it is and what one might be able to do within it (again, not welcome news 
for Williamson). 
2.3 Oliver Williamson 
Doug North is not so keen on Oliver Williamson who… does not care. It is because “The economic 
institutions of capitalism” do stand on their own, and for thirty years have made many obscure parts of 
economic life and economic reasoning clearer. Asset specificity, transaction cost, bonded rationality, 
opportunism, adaptation to unforeseen changes and uncertainty, alignment with governance structures, 
safeguards and credible commitment, etc. are genuinely mundane today in the economic toolbox. 
However, the universe being described by Williamson did become more and more diverse along his 
20-year long journey from 1975 to 1996. 
In his first very big step in 1975, Williamson says that if we concentrate on identifying the key 
economic institutions of capitalism, there are only two (as seen by Coase as early as 1937). They are: 
“Markets and Hierarchies” («Hierarchies» being a word substituting «firms», characterizing them 
better vis-a-vis the markets). However, in his second big step in 1985, Oliver basically says “Oops!”: 
there is a third key economic institution: “relational contracting”. It is what people do when 
transforming the Coasian process of decentralized negotiation into a durable frame of bilateral (or 
multilateral) cooperative agreement. You might also call it a “credible private ordering”. A significant 
private credibility can be added to voluntarily designed agreements by “using hostages to support 
trade” (see 1993). Ten years later in a third important step termed «Mechanisms of Governance» 
(1996), Oliver acknowledged that the logic governing his own set of economic institutions is even 
more complicated. On the one hand, the legal environment (either the Law or the regulations) as well 
as the social environment (think Chinese large families) can inevitably change the governance 
properties of alternative economic institutions, hence possibly favoring or handicapping the market 
vis-a-vis the firm or the relational contracting, etc. On the other hand, it also happens in fact that a so-
called “single” governance structure -as a firm- has to articulate a whole bunch of connected but 
different transactions. Williamson rightly quotes what Aoki does with the «Japanese Firm» (see Aoki 
1988). A firm which combines at least four related but very different components: 1- a governance of 
the workers’ tasks flows at the workshop level; 2- a governance of the managers’ behavior at the 
corporate level; 3- a governance of financial risks and investment financing by allied banks acting as 
long term close stakeholders; and 4- a governance of input supply flows from affiliated suppliers 
acting as another long term close stakeholders. Aoki himself added other institutional dimensions by 
distinguishing alternatives in organizing the production of skills and knowledge into the industry’s or 
the firm’s RD&D “technology innovation” process. 
2.4 Elinor Ostrom 
Notice that all these four founding fathers and mother finally got a Nobel Prize in (institutional) 
economics. But, Oliver Williamson having been so successful within our profession, another key 
institutionalist, Elinor Ostrom, had to protect her own research territory by asking us to forget Oliver: 
“forget markets & hierarchies”. Why? What for? 
From Elinor’s perspective (see 1990 & 2005), it is not because we address economic issues that we 
have to concentrate a priori on the so-called “Williamsonian economic institutions of capitalism”. For 
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her the only effective research strategy is to target the more relevant institutions for the chosen 
question. It means: the key institutions which really frame the area and the issues to be studied. As 
already suggested by Doug North, it is not necessarily the so-called “economic institutions” which are 
key in every economic process. The most relevant institutions might well be political, social or 
religious (as well formulated in the early 20th Century by Max Weber’s “protestant capitalism”; see 
1905).  
If you think Elinor, think about a community of practice, of repeated interactions, of local 
information gathering and sharing, of day-to-day sequential and interactive decision making, and of 
coherent or compatible beliefs. This might well recoup innovative and heterodox modern 
microeconomics: a la Akerlof –see 1984- (gift and counter-gift in a community of practice or 
endogenous selection of the individual standards of learning effort in a world of heterogeneous ethnic 
communities; etc.) or Avner Greif –see 1989 & 1993- (repeated long distance trade games in a narrow 
social milieu of a few endogamic families sharing a closed and demanding religion).  
3. Do network industries exist for NIE? 
While NIE certainly exists as a field of research questioning and reasoning, we may certainly frankly 
ask: Do «network industries» have anything to do or any place to find in that NIE field? I personally 
think so. While I also confess that it can be strongly debated or contested. The simplest starting point 
is that industries with very particular features should depart more from the classical economic 
reasoning for a world with no transaction costs. However, such a starting point is too poor to get to the 
point –which is not why to start, but where to go. And I feel better coming back to the four founding 
institutionalists to try to speak about it with their own voices. Again, I am already very sorry for any 
inconvenience or inappropriate statements that may follow. 
3.1 a la Ronald Coase 
It might be true than Ronald Coase would have been very bored with any research on “network 
industries”. But maybe not. He so frequently did work himself like an entomologist: he did spend a lot 
of time to see how bees are really used to fertilize orchards; how coast lighthouses were actually 
funded and managed in communities; how cattle and corn fields might coexist –or not- in the US 
West; how to restructure the radio and TV industry as a non-governmental and open business. He also 
spent his very last years on earth studying China’s long march out of extreme poverty and Maoism. 
Why not waste a couple of months with network industries? 
At least Stephen Littlechild, one of the Coase’s closest admirers, did something similar by 
proposing a quite Coasian “network industries re-arrangement” (see 2014). First, get the network 
industry property rights’ order in line by unbundling the monopoly activities from the potentially 
competitive activities. Second, get the market participants’ network property rights in order by giving 
“network access rights” to all third parties. Third, get the incentives right on both sides of the split 
network industries by a) keeping an open entry on the competitive side and letting players find their 
profit how and where they can, b) mimicking a market process on the regulated side with an incentive 
regulation and RPI-X formula (later on also add “performance based regulation” with profit and risk 
sharing). It is as simple as that to open a Coasian boulevard across the many bunkers and trenches of 
network industries. True, Coase presumably did not like “systems” and handbooks; he did not write 
any. “Just do it right” seems a very Coasian approach indeed. Why not use Littlechild’s approach to 
network industries then? 
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3.2 a la Oliver Williamson 
Oliver Williamson would tell us that he of course -and since very long- opened the black box of 
network industries in the light of his “economic institutions of capitalism”. Looking at his 1976 TV 
cable article and his corresponding 1985 book chapter, Oliver is even very proud of having resisted the 
Harold Demsetz 1968 claim of easily suppressing all existing network monopolies by opening vibrant 
markets for franchise. For Oliver the “competition for the market” can only exist if the corresponding 
activity has no strong network effects. Why? Because to neutralize the long term and enduring 
network assets effects at the ex-ante competitive stage, one needs to be able to define an effective long 
term contract foreseeing all the future significant contingencies and predicting the corresponding 
appropriate behavior of the network operator. In Coasian words: one then assumes no transaction 
costs, hence a perfect ex ante bargaining ending in a perfect ex ante contracting. Better to say that you 
assume that these network industries will never have significant network effects that might end up 
derailing the right implementation of the ex-ante “competitive” contracting process. The feeble point 
of Demsetz reasoning –from the Oliver’s point of view- is this imaginary capability to define ex ante a 
credible set of contractible terms and conditions keeping the transactions “aligned” all along the long 
life of the network assets. For Oliver they are the asset specificities of networks which finally 
annihilate the economic guidance provided by the ex-ante competition crystallized in the ex-ante 
franchise contract. In the network industries there is an «irreversible transformation» which cannot be 
avoided: the ex-ante competitive guidance does not last because they are the network effects which 
last. Hence, networks always need either a bilateral or a multilateral governance linking their “B2B” 
users and their network operators (see Glachant, Dubois & Perez 2008). Or, with millions of 
households or small and medium businesses at stake, a trilateral governance is even needed where a 
Third Party specializes in the general ruling of network operation and its following up (either 
adaptation to circumstances or settlement of conflicts). We actually call these third parties 
“regulators” and the ex-ante “regulated contract” they refer to is a typically “incomplete contract” 
which evolves through time through bargaining and regulatory decisions. Even if one can use a 
competitive process of monopoly franchise allocation, network industries guaranteeing an open access 
to their networks need a regulator and a regulated contract. (Joskow 1983 and Wiiliamson 1976; 
Glachant-Perez 2011; Glachant – Hallack – Vazquez 2013 & 2014) 
3.3 a la Doug North 
Doug North would probably not like the way we have approached our issue till now. For Doug we 
should look first at the big picture, at the trunk, and not to focus immediately on the leaves and a few 
branches (as Oliver typically does, according to Doug). The big question with regulation is not to look 
for a good or a better contract, for a first best or a second best contract. It is mainly a question of 
institutional frame, not to speak immediately of institutional endowment.  
What does the polity of your country typically do with this type of network industry issues? What 
do the lobbies at Parliament and around the government do? Do they even prefer to lobby or to sue? 
What then might the courts and the judges do? Or the Competition Authority? Do you even have a 
multilevel set of institutions with local regulators, courts and governments, etc. along a federal level of 
similar authorities? And how do they combine then (de Hauteclocque 2013; Glachant, Finon & de 
Hauteclocque 2011)? These are the only key questions that you cannot avoid asking (see Spiller 200_ 
& 2011; Holburn & Spiller 2008). 
If you are not ready to build the corresponding reasoning and to apply it to your network industry 
issues it is better for you to not start studying such a topic. It is because you will not grasp what is 
really at stake as long as you ignore the big mountains like the nature of decision-making in a multi-
level (local and federal) and multi-channel (sector regulation; competition policy; courts and executive 
power) institutional landscape (see Levy & Spiller, Spiller for an overview). Do you even notice that 
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the US and the EU are at odds regarding their multi-level and multi-channel institutional endowments? 
How then could the US and EU ever reproduce each other’s network industry policies? 
3.4 a la Elinor Ostrom 
I assume that Elinor might have said that the relevant picture depends on the precise research question 
that you address. Sometimes it is true that it is the trunk only. But other times it might only be the 
branches or even some of the leaves. However, it is not too controversial to assume that regulation of 
network industries is not a case for better contracts or better contracting frames most of the time. It is 
more frequently a case of better institutional frame.  
Even to address strong network externalities you might find a professional milieu compact and 
meshed enough to share most of the relevant information, evolving knowledge, related ex ante 
expectations and ex post measurement. All this might quite easily be conducive to an innovative 
multilateral network arrangement openly managed within the business community, or even managed 
by an “Agent” of this business community (as an interested intermediary, a neutral Third Party, a 
private association or a business platform as a hub). Remember that the market platforms called 
“exchanges” (the ordinary prototypes of a capitalist market institution) have been organized for 
decades in the US as cooperatives managed by the communities of trade intermediaries (see Craig 
Pirong 2014). In the same vein, what the Europeans call «Transmission System Operators» are 
transmission companies owning and operating the networks for gas or for electricity under open access 
and can be replaced in the USA by «Independent System Operators» which do not own the assets, but 
only operate them under the supervision of a nexus of professional stakeholders owning formal and 
informal decision rights used in the ISOs internal rule making (cf. working groups, task forces, general 
assembly, executive committee, etc.). Vice versa, the EU law has created, alongside an agency for 
cooperation of European energy regulators (ACER), two other entities working as official bodies of 
network operators (ENTSO-E for electricity; ENTSO-G for gas). These ENTSOs notably do the 
common EU grid indicative planning called “Ten Year Network Development Plan” as well as the 
drafting of all the new official EU grid codes. To conclude: do not forget the business communities 
when thinking about networks operation and open access implementation. 
4. And so what? 
Research is a journey only worth its final fruits. And so what? What would you miss by forgetting 
these four institutional approaches when addressing governance issues for network industries? 
According to me you would miss a lot. Make your own mind by reading this last part. 
4.1 The first core of network industry applied institutionalism: markets & firms 
As previously suggested, the first visible core of applied institutionalism for network industries is “the 
economics of governance within economic institutions”. Yes, it is a Williamsonian approach. It is 
about “Markets versus Hierarchies”. How can you deny that it started that way? We had vertically 
integrated monopolies. But why, and what for? Do they have feasible and effective enough market-
based substitutes or not? Why? How do we make this work? What’s a feasible transition path? There 
are many other questions we can ask. Three decades after Paul Joskow’s pioneering book, “Markets 
for Power. An Analysis of Electrical Utilities Deregulation” (1983), we can only acknowledge where 
we are coming from. Fairness would be to add the engineering roots of the same utility deregulation 
process, the mathematical theory of nodal pricing coming from Schwepee &Co (see 1988), to Paul’s 
early institutional economics at MIT.  
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4.1.1 Markets 
But we have to immediately remember that they are markets at stake in the network industries’ 
shaking up. Markets with a bold long «s». There does not exist any ideal single model of market 
(without «s») to build on the foundations of the network industries (see Wilson 2002). Keep in mind 
the extended market zoology we are in: centralized markets (as «PXs») versus decentralized (with 
only OTC and a few brokers). See «spot only» markets versus « a sequence of articulated spot and 
future», or even a long sequence splitting the spot into an organized succession of «day-
ahead/intraday/gate closure/balancing and real time». Keep an eye on «nodal» (each network node 
will have a price formation mechanism) versus «zonal» (the managerial zone of each existing network 
operator is called a due reference market zone). If you are already suffocating under the avalanche of 
market alternatives, I will not elaborate more on the various ways of combining market places across 
their various zones (“explicit” vs “implicit” coordination, market “coupling” vs market “splitting”, and 
the like, such as whether to merge the ultimate “real time” step of balancing markets cross-border) 
(see Glachant & Ruester 2014; Glachant – Hallack – Vazquez 2014).  
Nevertheless, just a word on an “explicit” coordination of neighboring commodity markets: in an 
explicit cross-border market regime, a commodity market player has to explicitly bid in the 
independent transmission market to get access to the grid interconnection through cross-border 
network capacity. It is therefore his own and full responsibility to rightly foresee what his position 
would be in the merit order of the two neighboring commodity markets to actually benefit from his 
connection capacity bid. On the other hand, what is an “implicit” combination of neighboring 
commodity markets then? In this implicit regime of market coordination, the market player’s position 
in the merit order of neighboring commodity markets automatically drives the allocation of cross-
border network capacity. As soon as any commodity bid is good enough in the connected commodity 
markets, the related network operators give it the corresponding connection grid capacity. Now 
remember what a grid vis-à-vis the commodity in a network industry chain is: the downstream of the 
industry upstream. This shows you that an “implicit” combination of markets actually merge two 
successive industry steps: the upstream and the downstream. In other words, an “implicit” 
combination of markets is a de facto vertical merger within the industry chain. But the operation of 
this “within industry merger” is driven by the commodity markets’ merit order. Isn’t it a speaking 
example of an effective and innovative “market design”? 
4.1.2 Firms 
Like “Market” being contradicted by markets, “The Firm” has not anymore existed for about 40 to 50 
years (see A. Chandler’s 1962 seminal book which literally pushed Williamson into “Markets and 
Hierarchies”). It is of course because we have so many different firms. As centralized firms with a 
«U» (Unitary) form vs decentralized firms with a «M» (Multidivisional) form. Does the firm roughly 
have only one central coherent output (rather to choose a U form) or many heterogeneous outputs 
(rather to go for a M form)? Maybe the firm single typical output is only delivered within various 
autonomous teams or zones (opt then rather for a “U.Territories and M.Headquarter” form –like 
MacDonald or Starbuck or an air transportation company such as Lufthansa or Easy Jet). It might also 
come a contest between «thin» firms (being organized only behind the walls of their facilities) versus 
«large» firms (expanding their organizational boundaries to other players acting outside their 
premises, in either the case of the Japanese firm Aoki or the many «Hybrid Forms» of Claude 
Ménard). This differentiation easily expands to governance operated only firm by firm or, on the other 
end of the spectrum, touching upon a whole industry (see “industry institutional chains” in Ménard & 
Shirley 2005). In the late institutionalist “strategic management research” all this thinking ends up 
operating in a reverse order: If you know what a given company is really good at governing better than 
its competitors, why not revisit and redefine all the rules and targets of its operation, investment and 
expansion to strengthen its market positioning even more? (see Oxley & Silverman 2008; and 
Nickerson 2008). 
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4.2 The second core of network industry applied institutionalism: alignment of governance with 
transactions  
Identifying various markets and various firms is good -to underline that we intend to play legos in 
academia parallel to the real world of practice. But we still miss a minimum understanding of the basic 
rules of that extended game: how do we intend (or expect) to match these many components? We need 
to operationalize a bit more our reasoning here (Claude Menard: operationalizing is key with 
institutional economics which are too complex to work in a vacuum with no established “stylized 
facts”). It is also expressed as a key principle of the Williamsonian institutionalism: the “alignment” 
between the governance structures and the characteristics of transactions. If you do not define the 
governance structures you are referring to and do not detail the transactions that you are addressing, 
you cannot infer anything significant. 
4.2.1 Firms and markets as governance structures 
We may start the reasoning about our “alignment” research principle from its governance structures’ 
side. We have to align a governance structure, say a firm, with transactions knowing in advance that 
all the firms are not a homogeneous and single species. We know that, like elephants, mice, pigs and 
dogs being all mammals, all our firms are related animals but cannot cross-reproduce. Firms have 
heterogeneous institutional and transactional characteristics. They are simply unable to all do the same 
things; to all undertake the same range of activities. It is because of its very particular institutional 
nature that a certain firm (let say «A») will rely on a market for transaction (let say «x» or «y») while 
another firm (let say «J») will never ever do that because it has the very nature needed to self-
undertake that type of transaction. 
In fact, exactly the same applies to markets. We have so many different types of markets in their 
internal information and decision making (centralized vs decentralized), in their time horizons (spot vs 
future), in their space cohesion (nodal vs zonal), in their lateral coordination (as coupling or splitting), 
and in their vertical coordination (as explicit vs implicit). Hence, you can only foresee that markets 
too, like firms, have very heterogeneous institutional and transactional characteristics. The various 
markets are simply unable to all do the same things. They cannot all undertake the same range of 
activities. Because of its very institutional nature, a certain market (let say of type W) would let a firm 
(let say of type FF) handle a transaction of type (TT) while –actually- a market of type WW would 
have done the job much better than this FF firm. 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of both firms and markets, the “true” institutional properties 
of a given firm vis-a-vis a given market cannot be blindly defined before opening our eyes wide in a 
careful investigation of the precise properties of both this firm and that market. It is typical of New 
Institutional Economics to think that firms and markets can compete to substitute each other in the 
governance of the myriad of old or new transaction types popping up in the flows of economic change 
and innovation. However, the level at which the institutional research reasoning works is very low. It 
is not macro, or even micro, but “nano” (as Kenneth Arrow rightly said about Williamson 1985). 
Institutions live there. Nanoeconomics: the research level at which many details are not anecdotes, but 
key. A research strategy cannot be to try to open (or close) any door with any key. It is not even the 
end of the institutional «alignment» journey because it takes two to tango: Governance structures 
compete only to match with transactions.  
4.2.2 Transactions as targets of governance structures 
I understand this “transactions as targets” sub-topic in that characteristics of transactions are not given 
by the primary laws of physics. There are no Kirchhoff laws applying to integrated monopolies from 
North Korea to Nord Pool and OTC trading. Physics are only an underground. Technology is a floor 
BUT not the foundation. Why should technology not be the foundation? In my mind it is because a 
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“transaction” requires an “arrangement” through which one actually transfers a service, a component, 
a good etc. from one agent to another between two technologically separable units. Hence, where it is 
technology which strictly dictates how agents are combined in an economic operation, there is no 
transaction. It is where technology lets people separate and combine in many ways that there is room 
for transaction(s). 
But let’s also be frank. The way technology combines and cuts among agents is also a choice (or a 
“super-choice”: up to you to choose what level of choice). We know it well today because we think 
under the paradigm of “modularity”. The concept of modularity comes from the industry 
manufacturing re-organization in the past 30 years and has been well identified by (Baldwin & Clark 
2006). The concept of “Modularity” simply says that one designs technology «borders» and 
technology «sets» in a vein similar to «Post-Coasian market design» and «Aoki’s company design». In 
this early 21st Century we human beings design all the components of our economic institutions “by 
intended design”: markets, firms, and transactions across technologically separable units. Of course 
our rationality is always limited and “bounded”. But it is exactly why we design a lot: knowing our 
limits, we also want to limit the areas of consequential uncertainty consequences.  
“Modularity” means that one voluntarily glues a bunch of tasks with a “particular or proprietary 
technology or arrangement” to reinforce the local interdependence of each task with each other related 
tasks in the very same module. It is why we find there, inside each module, many tasks having local 
similarities of characteristics and of interdependence. 
At the borders of each module, one voluntarily packs her bunch of tasks by designing them a 
common “interface” with the rest of the world. That interface is a technologically or institutionally 
defined gate by which each bunch of tasks might cooperate with the other bunches of tasks. That 
interface has well defined properties intended to be “interoperable” with the many other well defined 
interfaces. At a limit, anyone in the future might be able to design new interfaces to be interoperable 
with the existing old ones if any economic value is still at stake in an interplay of various vintages of 
interfaces. 
Of course tasks interact more locally (inside their designed module) through locally particular rules 
of interaction. BUT the same tasks also can interact with other tasks from other modules through well-
defined interfaces. We might end up with a typical “plug & play” open chain which mimics a 
technological and institutional continuum. One can really freely do “anything” he wants locally (inside 
his proprietary module of tasks) while keeping open all the opportunity benefits of further interactions 
(with other modules) as long as he well defines the interface through which his local module of tasks 
plays with other modules (See again Brousseau & Glachant 2011; Glachant & Perez 2008 & 2011). 
In a nutshell, the “modularity” principle brings a bomb into the economics of governance. It is 
particularly a bomb for us, researchers in the governance of network industries, because most of our 
industries have been massively designed or redesigned in many directions. 1- One designs/redesigns 
new technological or institutional modules, hence the new workable technological or institutional 
interplay between these modules. And this literally designs the space of feasible transactions among 
modules, hence the demand for governance structures. 2- One also designs new markets and the 
corresponding allowed firms which delineate the space of feasible governance structures. This gives us 
an offer of possible governance structures. 3- One then has to match the feasible transactions with the 
allowed governance structures. It is what the practitioner does in his field of play, and what the 
researcher tries to understand in his field of New Institutional reasoning. Of course one practitioner 
might only look for a quiet workable arrangement among already existing tasks and waterproofed 
arrangements. Such a practitioner hence roughly plays a quiet game a la Oliver Williamson 1985. But 
another practitioner might want to act more “strategically”. He can voluntarily look at a brand new and 
more exclusive match between his self-designed characteristics of transactions and some specially 
designed properties of sophisticated new governance structures. Such a practitioner literally plays 
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strategic a la Nickerson – Silverman because he creates the world of institutional alignment in which 
to make his play.  
4.3 The chemistry around the core of network industry applied institutionalism: both transactions 
and governance structures are “context dependent” 
We do like the “institutional alignment” principle (Transactions/Governance Structures) inherited 
from Oliver Williamson 1985. But we know that Doug North is not wrong when saying that the 
institutional trunk (the “society institutional endowment”) might weigh more than the leaves or the 
branches (let say the Oliver “private ordering”). As we have already seen, Oliver himself enunciated a 
«revised» alignment principle in 1996 in his «Mechanisms of Governance». Of course in network 
industries everybody has known for a long time that both transactions and governance structures are 
«context dependent», given the incredible amount of laws, regulations, by-laws, rules, codes, 
standards, plus court decisions, etc. issued for these industries for 20 to 30 years. One already 
acknowledges at the end of the 20th Century that “deregulation” is the only inappropriate term to 
characterize the liberalization process in network industries (see Majone 1990). 
Look only at the unbundling principle -so strong in the EU liberalization process. One prohibits 
key parts of the industry chain (basically this or that network) to merge its operation and investment 
processes with the other parts of the industry which use these networks. One makes this intra-industry 
tasks and business independence mandatory. One also prohibits particular and privileged bilateral 
contracting between the network and some of its users. One makes an “open access regime” 
mandatory for all potential users of the network. This access is therefore inevitably regulated because 
it has to be user neutral, user transparent and proportionate to a cost base and a service quality level.  
This European process also creates new entities named «network operators: TSOs, DSOs» with 
chartered rights and duties, notably in the management of interconnections and the investment process 
(See Glachant – Hallack & Vazquez 2014). It might even end up, still in the EU, with a de facto 
operational merger between network operators and wholesale market operators, as we have seen 
earlier with the European «market coupling» and «market splitting» mechanisms. We therefore see 
how the industry structure, the boundaries of the firms, the governance properties of the markets, as 
well as the set of feasible transactions and possible transactional arrangements are so strongly “context 
dependent”. 
Of course the EU as institutional environment is only what it is. In practice in the EU the 
implementation of European network industry and sector market common rules is made only at the 
national level with about thirty national sets of “parliaments/governments/courts/sector 
regulators/competition authorities”. This other fundamental characteristic of the European institutional 
context for network industries implies - of course - significant differences between making a 
transaction here or there and between relying on this or that alternative governance structure for this or 
that transaction (see Pagano 2003).  
Furthermore, in the US the federal sector regulator is assumed a priori to be right vis-à-vis the 
federal competition policy (it is the “Trinko doctrine” of the Supreme Court). This is not the case in 
the EU (de Hauteclocque 2013; Glachant, Finon & de Hauteclocque 2011). First of all, DG 
Competition can strongly disagree with a sector regulator decision at any time, then act against and 
nullify it (see DG COMP versus German regulator for telecom in the Deutsche Telekom case, or the 
action against the Swedish TSO Svenska Krafnet). Second, the EU Supreme Court can rearrange the 
formal priority between sector regulation and competition itself: Think “State Aid” for support to 
renewable energy. More than a decade ago the EU Court froze the free market & competition policy 
priority to let the renewables (RES) support flows. Today the same court seems to go the other way 
around and might be on the verge of breaking all the existing European apparatus of RES support in 
the name of free market and competition policy priority… 
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We inevitably end up with a scheme of institutional co-design of transactions and of governance 
structures, as both are strongly constrained by their larger institutional environment where the larger 
society endowment plays a key role. In the real world, the EU network industries are visibly put in a 
multi-zone frame (because of EU remaining internal borders between legal and administrative national 
zones) as well as in a multi-level frame (with at least a national level and a European level), and also in 
a multi-channel frame (with at least a sector regulation and a general competition policy). This is why 
it is not enough for a researcher to say that “institutions matter”. Researchers really need to a) say 
what the issue at stake is and b) define a precise set of institutions involved before c) making a 
tractable enough research agenda. 
We end up this at institutional reasoning with an analytical matrix frame made at least of two 
columns (Characteristics of Transactions and Properties of Governance Structures) and of two lines 
(Multi Level: national vs EU; Multi Channel: sector regulation vs competition policy). 
 
 Characteristics of Transactions Properties of Governance 
Structures 
Multi Level  
(Countries vs EU) 
  
Multi Channel  
(Sector Regulation vs 
Competition Policy) 
  
4.4 The mind around the core of network industry applied institutionalism: the informal play in 
professional communities 
However, an important part of the context dependence of network industries upon the institutional 
environment is not as formal as «Law and Regulation», «Unbundling and Third Party Access» or 
«Market Design Principles». Network industries also live in professional milieus where many key 
agents are actually «professional third parties» vis-a-vis the market players. In the EU most of the time 
these third parties play such a pivotal role (in the industry as in the market) that they are called 
“operators”, such as network operators, system operators, or market operators. They are not law 
makers, lawyers or even regulators. They only have to produce the common services that all the other 
players need to play their own market and business play. They are the market facilitators or the 
industry platforms. Because of their role and of their status, they are induced to create and animate 
“professional communities” a la Ostrom where they quasi voluntarily submit themselves to informal 
constraints and influences, to information and knowledge sharing, and to revelation of preferences and 
negotiation of judgment criteria. As Ostrom reigns here (see 2010), we encounter repeated 
interactions, reciprocity, reputation, informal coding of individual behavior through shared belief and 
common memory, etc. This informal setting overplays many formal codes and rules. Typically in the 
USA the «Independent System Operators» are strongly independent from the administration and the 
polity but very responsive to their professional communities -their constituencies. 
Conclusion 
Any reasonable reasoning about governance structures in the network industries ends up with an 
institutional matrix which is very demanding for any researcher. The world we are in is at least multi-
level and multi-channel (not to mention multi-zone). And it is where we have to start building a 
workable alignment frame between the real characteristics of the transactions and the actual properties 
of the governance structures. Such a workable alignment is therefore not a strong piece of hard 
science, but a flexible case for sensible reasoning. We immediately remember why Ronald Coase was 
not a big fan of systematic treaties of the Coasian universe of transaction economics. Maybe he 
nevertheless should have tried to do a bit more as he finally did in his enormous investigation on 
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China’s self-rediscovery of all the basic properties of a so-called “market based” economy. Anyway, 
Oliver Williamson, Douglass North and Elinor Ostrom did deliver outstanding supplements to Coase 
in the understanding of the real world of an industry play and its institutional structures. 
1. We have actually seen that institutional economics provide a useful frame to navigate the fuzzy 
world of governance structures. Of course markets, firms and relational contracting (or Hybrid Forms) 
are alternative tools which can complement or substitute each other to frame transactions made among 
economic agents. However, firms are not a single piece of governance structure as they might handle 
different transactions very differently. Either inside the firm, such as the day-to-day operational 
workflow, the hazards of R&D discovery and trials, the long term production of skills and knowledge 
through organized definition and allocation of tasks, the coordination between today’s and tomorrow’s 
operations e.g. between the various levels of management and the interactions with the stockholders, 
or outside the firm in the interactions with suppliers, customers bankers and the social or professional 
communities. Truly, those firms are all conglomerates of several governance sub-structures. So are the 
markets conglomerates of several governance mechanisms. It is why we are able to think about 
designing/redesigning the markets we have and to move to get the markets that we would like to have. 
The already decade old impressive book of Aoki shows how this institutional interplay expands 
between all the firm components to all the industry structures and across many alternative market 
arrangements. 
Furthermore, present state and coming evolution of the economic properties of both the firms and 
the markets (as well as the Hybrid Forms) are interdependent, as firms and markets (or Hybrids) are 
both substitutes and complements. They also are all sensitive to the constraints and opportunities 
offered by the society general institutional endowment. As for the set of possible governance 
structures, the set of feasible transactions emerges from an interplay with governance structures and 
the general endowment. The Akerlof “market for lemons” is a paradigmatic view of how transactions 
rise or die according to the actual set of possible governance structures.  
2. But we also saw that network industries are a particularly flexible case of institutional flexibility 
regarding the alignment between transactions and governance structures. “Liberalised” network 
industries needed and still need an “intense” design and re-design to be able to host any kind of 
markets and to interact with. Network industries are particularly sensitive to «modularity» and «tasks 
packaging» all along the industry value chain. What we call network and market areas are themselves 
pre-defined by decisions taken into the modular designing of network industries. Hence, the whole set 
of alternative feasible variants of market, industry and firm arrangements is particularly large and 
variable in the network industries (See again the latest 2014 Glachant – Ruester or Glachant – Hallack 
– Vazquez). 
In practice, several key institutional characteristics may be rigid and inflexible –even if badly 
illogical or discretionary. This creates sub-worlds of “institutional complementarity” a la Ugo Pagano 
with intractable institutional inflexibility and restricted variants for governance and transactions. It 
also creates «anti-worlds». Given that, let’s say, institutional features (a), (d) and (p) are truly 
inflexible and invariant into this or that particular sub-world, certain governance structures and certain 
transactions might have –only in this sub-world- very particular matching properties that cannot be 
reached anywhere else and that cannot be suppressed by importing “alien first best matching” from 
foreign sub-worlds. Real institutional life is such that there is no guaranteed institutional transitivity 
from one institutional sub-world to the other. Yes, “institutions matter” and that is why.  
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